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In this paper we investigate some factors shaping individual support for protectionism that 
have not been studied previously. We examine a heterogeneous sample of thirty countries 
which includes both small and large and developed and developing countries using data 
from the 2003 International Social Survey Program (ISSP).  
We confirm the influence of social status (education, age and relative income), values and 
attachments on preferences for trade policies and the fact that skilled people are also more 
likely to be pro-trade. We also verify previous findings concerning the fact that 
individual’s opinions match with how their revenue could be affected in the medium or 
long term by trade liberalization. We highlight other important factors influencing public 
opinion towards protectionism: individual support for protectionism is also affected by the 
macroeconomic context and size of their country of residence. 
 
JEL classification: D01, F13 




Este trabajo analiza algunos elementos que modelan las preferencias de los individuos por 
las políticas restrictivas del comercio internacional o proteccionismo que no han sido 
estudiados anteriormente. El set de datos es la encuesta del año 2003 de la red International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP). Esta es una muestra de más de treinta países por lo cual 
presenta un grado relevante de heterogeneidad que incluye tanto economías grandes y 
pequeñas, desarrolladas y en vías de desarrollo. 
En línea con la literature previa, se confirman los resultados correspondientes a el status 
social (educación, edad e ingreso relativo), valores y apegos sobre las preferencias por las 
políticas comerciales y que los individuos más educatos tienden a apoyar el libre comercio. 
Se verifica que las opiniones individuales se vinculan a los efectos esperados de la 
liberalización comercial en los ingresos individuales tanto a medio como largo plazo. Se 
destacan los siguientes nuevos resultados: el contexto macroeconómico y el tamaño del 
país de residencia son determinantes del apoyo individual al proteccinismo. 
 
Clasificación JEL: D01, F13 
Palabras clave: preferencias, proteccionismo, libre comercio, mercantilismo, nacionalismo  1
1.  Introduction 
Trade restriction levels are strongly correlated with average support for protectionism 
among residents. Protectionism support mainly depends on non-economic factors such as 
religion, political preferences and nationalism, as well as demographic characteristics. 
Concerning economic determinants of protectionism, individuals’ preferences may depend 
on how their income will be affected by trade liberalization. In this paper, we investigate 
some yet-to-be-studied factors that may influence opinions towards trade policies. We 
argue that individual support for protectionism is not only affected by the above mentioned 
factors but also affected by the macroeconomic context of their country of residence. 
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2003 survey, which is available for more 
than thirty countries, offers a good opportunity for studying reasons for protectionism 
support. As previous studies have already demonstrated, the ISSP allows the influence of 
social status, relative income, values and attachments on preference formation to be 
checked. Additionally, one can test if individuals react according to how specialization 
affects their personal revenue. But it also offers a less investigated possibility, that is to 
verify to what extent the observed heterogeneity across individuals in their support for 
protectionism may be explained by some economic characteristics of their place of 
residence. To investigate this issue, we explain protectionism support using an ordered 
probit model that includes individual characteristics and country characteristics such as 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, average growth, inflation rate, import penetration 
rate, export ratio, an indicator of trade restrictions on imports and an indicator of market 
access. We also check if our results are sensitive to country type by distinguishing between 
large, small, European Union (EU) countries, non-EU countries, high income countries and 
low income countries.  
We confirm the previous findings of Mayda and Rodrik (2005) concerning the fact that 
individual’s opinions match with how their revenue could be affected in the medium or 
long term by trade liberalization. We also add new findings. First, we find that inflation 
increases protectionism support despite the fact that trade liberalisation could lead to a 
price reduction. Second, it seems that EU residents and those who live in large countries 
are aware of the possibilities they have to increase their terms of trade via protectionist 
measures. Finally, we find that more imports increase support for protectionism, while 
more exports decrease this support. In the same way, protectionist measures imposed by  2
the respondent’s country make individuals more pro-protectionism after controlling for 
endogenous bias. But more important is the fact that individuals take into account the 
access granted to their exports when considering the possibility of imposing restrictive 
measures on imports.  
In the second section of this paper we review the theory and evidence on this issue. In 
section three, we describe the empirical strategy used in this paper. In section four, we 
present and discuss the results, while we draw conclusions in section five.  
 
2.  Hypotheses and evidence concerning protectionism support 
2.1. The comparative advantage explanation 
Comparative advantage models explain how international trade affects personal income 
through changes in relative prices. Since the Hecksher-Ohlin model (H-O) assumes 
complete costless factor mobility across sectors, it is often presented as a long-run view. In 
contrast, the Ricardo-Viner model (R-V) assumes the existence of sector-specific factors 
and for this reason is often presented as a medium-term model. Based on the H-O model, 
unskilled workers in unskilled abundant countries are expected to support free trade, while 
skilled workers would be expected to oppose it. The opposite would occur in skill 
abundant countries. On the other hand, the R-V model predicts that specific factors of the 
importing sector will lose out from trade liberalization, but factors specific to the export 
sector will gain from it. Given that labour is not very mobile across sectors in the short 
term, individual trade policy preferences will depend on whether the person is employed in 
an import-substituting or exporting industry (Gawande and Krishna 2003). 
Although empirical studies confirm that trade policy preferences depend on an individual’s 
skills, the results of these studies are not fully in line with the H-O model. O’Rourke and 
Sinnott (2006); Baker (2005); Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and Beaulieu et al. (2004a) found 
that skilled workers are more prone to accept free trade, regardless of their country’s 
endowments. Furthermore, these studies showed that the differential in support for free 
trade between skilled and unskilled workers is higher in countries that are relatively 
abundant in skilled labour. Sanz and Martínez i Coma (2008) find more convincing results 
in favour of the H-O model. They study the opinion of European citizens towards 
globalization. In their sample, skills favour pro-trade attitudes in countries which are more  3
skill abundant than the sample average, while the opposite occurs in the rest of the 
countries. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) perform a comparative analysis of twenty-three 
countries using the ISSP and VVF databases. They find that people with higher human 
capital endowments oppose trade restrictions only in countries such as Germany and USA 
that are abundant in human capital, while the opposite happens in the Philippines (the 
poorest country in their sample). The remaining countries in the sample are half-way 
between these two extremes. Beaulieu et al. (2005) consider that the sample of countries in 
the ISSP database does not include a sufficient number of low-skilled countries to verify 
the H-O hypothesis. In their study on Latin American countries, they find that skilled 
workers are less likely to oppose free trade in all countries. An explication for this can be 
found in Rodrik (1997), who suggested that globalization tends to favour production 
factors that are internationally mobile. To the extent that skilled labour is more mobile than 
unskilled labor, skilled workers will be more optimistic about trade liberalization, 
regardless of the relative abundance of skills in their country (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006).  
2.2. Other economic factors influencing protectionism support  
Support for protectionism may therefore be explained by the impact of trade on individual 
income. But comparative advantage does not fully explain the differential wages within 
and across countries. Wood (1998) reports that imports of manufactured goods from 
developing countries account for a small fraction of OECD GDP (about three per cent). 
They point out that these volumes of trade are too small to have an important effect on 
wage inequality. A great part of world trade and more than half of the total volume of trade 
in high-income countries can be considered intra-industry trade.  
According to Helpman and Krugman (1996), the income redistribution effects of intra-
industry trade differ substantially from those of inter-industry trade. Two-way trade affects 
differentiated products and implies a reallocation of resources among firms, but within the 
same industry. Trade of similar products is explained by the similarity of tastes and 
production structures, thus explaining why two-way trade usually takes place between 
countries with similar levels of development and factor endowments. Furthermore, 
differentiated products are more capital intensive, thus explaining the fact that developed 
countries present higher levels of this type of trade. Accordingly, support for free trade 
should be higher in countries that are more involved in intra-industry trade. Indeed,  4
Beaulieu et al. (2004a) find that support for trade by skilled workers is systematically 
higher in countries with a higher level of intra-industry trade. 
The H-O model implies that trade liberalization would affect skilled and unskilled workers 
in a different manner. However, there are other explanations for the increasing skill 
premium within countries. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to study this 
phenomenon in depth, it is useful to mention the main explanations. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1997) argue that the increase in direct foreign investment in developing countries 
increases the skill intensity of production. Robbins (1996) suggests that trade may also be 
‘skill-enhancing’ since it accelerates the transfer of technology (incorporated in imports) 
which is complementary to skills (for further details see Beaulieu et al. 2001, 2004b and 
2004c; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999; Feenstra and Hanson 1997 and Sener 2001). 
Epifani and Gancia (2008) demonstrate that stronger returns to scale in skill-intensive 
sectors and monopolistic competition imply that any increase in the volume of trade, even 
between identical countries, tends to be skill-biased. De Santis (2003) and Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997) argue that sector-biased technical change could be considered the main 
cause of the increasing demand for skilled workers (the worldwide diffusion of technology 
leads to the development of high-skilled services).  
To the extent that the greater part of technology is imported (via imports of inputs or 
foreign direct investment, FDI), globalization also partly explains the increase of the skill 
premium since it contributes to this technology diffusion process. Hence, the link between 
trade liberalization and wages becomes more ambiguous (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006) and 
so do the conclusions regarding trade policy preferences. Additionally, people with higher 
educational levels anywhere in the world may be more flexible and more able to deal with 
the rigors of the market and therefore more likely to support trade liberalization (Gabel 
1998). This is an additional reason to explain why skilled workers are generally expected 
to be more willing to support free trade. 
Using a consumer survey, Denslow and Fullerton (1996) ask 913 respondents in Florida 
about their support for the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993. They 
find that education and confidence about future national performance variables are the 
most important determinants of consumer attitudes towards trade policy. Their results point 
to the influence of risk aversion on people’s attitudes.   5
In the same line, Beaulieu et al. (2005) find that countries with higher support for trade 
tended to be countries that grew faster in the last decade. Concerning risk aversion, Scheve 
and Slaughter (2004) show that FDI has increased worker insecurity in the UK since 
international firms face greater elasticity in terms of labour demand, thereby increasing the 
volatility of wages and employment. This phenomenon could explain the greater support 
for trade and migration restrictive policies in the UK. In line with this previous result, Mah 
(2002) shows that globalization strengthens income inequalities in Korea. The author 
proves that the Gini index tends to increase with FDI inflows and trade liberalization. 
Another key factor for explaining trade is the geographical proximity due to transportation 
costs (freight, communication, information costs) and affinity between countries since 
cultural, historical or political ties may influence consumer preferences and transaction 
costs.
1 Disdier and Mayer (2007) study the relationship between opinions in favour of the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU expressed by citizens of the EU and trade flows. They 
conclude that bilateral affinity has a large impact on trade even when proximity is 
controlled for. Thus, they find weak evidence for the reverse relationship, that is, the fact 
that trade and other country-specific factors significantly affect bilateral opinions about 
enlargement.  
Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) analyze support for EU membership in the new member and 
candidate countries of the EU in 2002 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and 
Turkey). The authors show that support for EU membership was not universally shared 
among the nationals of new member countries. Becoming a member affects the various 
socio-economic groups in two ways: 1) efficiency gains and 2) new economic 
opportunities (access to the European Single Market, inclusion in the redistribution system 
and the Common Agricultural Policy). Their results suggest that individuals with relatively 
flexible human capital (those with high education, white-collar occupations, high income, 
etc.) tend to support EU membership. In contrast, those who may benefit from 
redistribution in the EU (the elderly, less educated, unemployed, etc.) tend to oppose 
accession. According to the authors, this result implies that ‘the nationals of the new 
member states tend to put a greater weight on the gains from improved efficiency and new 
                                                 
1 Rauch (2001) shows that common language and colonial links have a large and positive impact on bilateral 
trade flows as proof of the importance of cultural links.  6
opportunities, while they discount the potential benefits from receiving subsidies from the 
richer EU member states’.  
Moreover, Caplanova et al. (2004) analyze attitudes to EU membership among countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. They find that good economic performance increases the 
probability of supporting membership as do education and personal income. Taking into 
account EU countries and this group of candidates, the authors find that, in all cases, 
education has a positive effect. However, this result does not verify the H-O model because 
human capital is relatively scarce in Central and Eastern Europe. 
As regards opinion polls, trade restriction levels are found to be strongly correlated with 
average support for protectionism among residents. But the sense of the causal relationship 
between preferences for protectionism and trade policies is not clear. Policy makers may 
design policies bearing in mind public opinion, that is, according to the ‘demand’ side. But 
in turn, trade policies may cause biased attitudes towards trade policies. As suggested by 
Mayda and Rodrik (2005), the ‘supply’ side may also be important. These authors test the 
hypothesis that trade policies may influence individuals’ attitudes in a non-uniform manner 
within a country, but do not find significant evidence to support this hypothesis.  
2.3. Non-economic factors 
The above papers agree that trade policy preferences largely depend on non-economic 
factors such as religion, political preferences and nationalism, as well as demographic 
characteristics. Regarding individuals’ ideology, one would expect that those who define 
themselves as belonging to the left would be more likely to support protectionist policies 
than those who identify with the right (Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005). Concerning the 
influence of religious beliefs, Guiso et al. (2003) argue that attitudes towards trade with 
‘others’ and accepting ‘others’ differ between religious denominations. In their study for 
the United States, they find that Catholics, Baptists and Methodists are more likely to 
support trade restrictions than those with no religious affiliation.  
Undoubtedly, attachment to country and national pride matter in any debate concerning 
external policies issues. O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) state that these values play an 
important role in trade-policy preferences due to the fact that such elements could translate 
into feelings of national superiority and the rejection of foreign products. In this respect, 
there are different degrees of attachment to one's country which shape the differences  7
between patriotism, nationalism and chauvinism. Patriotism is the genuine feeling of 
attachment to one's country, while nationalism implies a greater devotion to one's country 
placing it above others and chauvinism is an extreme form of nationalism characterized by 
a feeling of superiority in regard to other nations (Mayda and Rodrik 2005).  
While all three concepts are linked to national pride, they are clearly different from one 
another. National pride and patriotism coexist, while nationalism goes far beyond national 
pride. Indeed, the latter is a prerequisite to the former. Thus, there is no contradiction 
between feelings such as national pride and cosmopolitanism, whereas nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism are in essence contradictory (Smith and Kin 2006). In consequence, 
patriotism is not contradictory to supporting free trade, while in the case of nationalism the 
relationship is ambiguous. The attitude taken will depend on the person’s intake on the 
consequences of free trade. If the person sees free trade as a positive-sum game, and 
therefore accepts that trade implies benefits for the country as a whole, one would expect 
‘patriots’ (those who are concerned for their country as a whole and do not consider 
distributive effects) to favour free trade. However, if the person perceives trade as a zero-
sum game in which some nations win and others lose or if they consider that the social 
consequences could be adverse, they would be likely to support trade restrictions. Finally, 
those who consider that their country is better than others are more likely to prefer their 
country’s isolation and would therefore support import-restrictive policies (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005). 
As concerns political systems, O’Rourke and Taylor (2006) argue that a democratic system 
is not enough to guarantee free trade and show that relative factor endowments play a more 
relevant role. Restrictions to trade will be lower if workers benefit from them (this is true 
when human capital is relatively abundant) and vice versa.  
Finally, there are many demographic variables that are relevant to explaining trade policy 
preferences. For example, in regard to age and gender, previous empirical studies have 
shown that the elderly are more likely to support import-restrictive policies than younger 
people. The same can be said for women in comparison to men. Additionally, some 
empirical studies (Mayda and Rodrik 2005 or O´Rourke and Sinnott 2006) find that 
married people are also more likely to support trade restrictions.  8
3.  Empirical strategy 
We study how the different characteristics of both individuals and countries affect support 
for protectionism. To this end, we estimate ordered probit models. The degree of support 
for protectionism is related to a set of independent variables observed at either the 
individual level or the country level.  
3.1. Characterizing respondents 
In this paper we use data from the National Identity module of the 2003 International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP is an ongoing effort devoted to cross-national 
research on social attitudes. The survey asks respondents about their opinions on a great 
variety of issues, including trade preferences, immigration, patriotism and politics, as well 
as demographic and socio-economic information such as age, gender, education, 
religiosity, political party affiliation and others. The individuals are from 33 countries 
across all five continents.
2 
The question used in the survey to identify respondents’ trade preferences is: How much 
do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Respondent’s country’ should limit 
the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.
3 It could be argued 
that the last part of the question (‘in order to protect its national economy’) leads to a 
biased response in favour of protectionism as it implies that limiting imports is a way of 
protecting the economy and is therefore something positive. However, there are two 
arguments that partially detract from this criticism. Firstly, this is the usual manner of 
speech employed to defend protectionist policies and thus the normal terms used to discuss 
the matter. Hence, this question would not necessarily induce the respondent to answer in a 
particular way. And secondly, because the goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship 
between this variable and others and not to estimate the absolute level of support for 
protectionism, our analysis is less vulnerable to this type of bias (O'Rourke and Sinnott 
2006). 
                                                 
2 Germany and Israel were included as the whole country even when the dataset includes two regions. Due to 
lack of data about income, South Africa and Venezuela were not included. 
3 The dependent variable (PROTEC) that corresponds to the answer is coded as follows: three being agree or 
agree strongly, two being neither agree nor disagree and one being disagree or disagree strongly. Mayda and 
Rodrik. (2005) chose to transform the answer into a dummy variable (that equals one if people agree or agree 
strongly and zero in other cases). We opted for another possibility since we think that people who neither 
agree nor disagree should be considered as being more supportive for protectionism than people who 
disagree.  9
Table 1: Answers by country  
On average, about 1,000 people have answered the survey in each country, obtaining a 
total of 42,154 observations. Table one shows the distribution of answers for each country. 
The share of people supporting protectionism ranges from 28.9 per cent (in Sweden) to 
76.4 per cent (in Bulgaria). The share of people who clearly disagree or strongly disagree 
with protectionism measures rarely exceeds 30 per cent except for Switzerland (43 per 
cent), Sweden (35 per cent), Norway (36 per cent) and Denmark (48 per cent). It is striking 
that these last three countries are neighbours and have similar political systems with a high 
level of state intervention. 
The ISSP dataset provides a unique opportunity to verify all the hypotheses emerging from 
the previous review of the literature. For the purpose of the model, national characteristics 
and the responses by individuals have been recoded into dummy variables. We take into 
account years of education (EDUYRS). Personal skills are the key-variable to verify 
whether an individual reacts according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In our data, we 
have high, middle and lower-middle income countries (according to the World Bank 
classification, Atlas Method). Our sample is less biased towards rich countries than the 
1995 ISSP used in Mayda and Rodrik (2005), though we cannot consider that we have a 
representative sample of poor countries. The ISSP also provides information about 
earnings, which we include in logarithms (LRINC) and a subjective evaluation by the 
individual regarding his or her social status (UPPER_CLASS). We expect that the 
probability of supporting protectionism decreases as years of education and/or income 
increase. 
We also consider the individual’s political affiliation (RIGHT), religious attendance 
(ATTEND), union affiliation (UNION), variables related to attachments (ATTACH), 
patriotism (PRIDE1 and PRIDE2), nationalism (NATSUP), pride for democracy 
(DEMPR) and pride in the economic achievements (ECONPR) of the country. As concerns 
demographic variables, we consider age (AGE), marital status (NOT_MARRIED) and 
gender (FEMALE), which usually strengthen the protectionist view. For the reasons 
explained in the previous section, we expect all of these variables to have a positive impact 
on individuals’ support for protectionism, except for RIGHT and NOT_MARRIED, for 
which a negative impact is expected. A description of the independent variables can be 
found in table two.   10
Table 2: Description of variables 
Finally, we generate a variable concerning the respondent’s specific occupation in order to 
test the predictions of the H-O and R-V models. In the ISSP survey, this information is 
coded according to the International Statistical Comparisons of Occupational and Social 
Structures, ISCO-88, providing information about the occupation but not directly about the 
industry. We reclassify the occupation variables from the ISSP data set in order to match 
them with the CHELEM database. In most cases, the classification indicates the industry 
like “ glass, ceramics and related plant operators” but for some occupations we only know 
if they work in agriculture, manufacturing or services like “managers of small enterprises 
in manufacturing” and were not able to assign them to a more detailed manufacturing 
industry.  
On the one hand, we reclassified this information into three productive sectors: agriculture, 
industry and services. Since industrial and agricultural products are more easily traded than 
services, we expect people working in non-trading sectors to be more likely to favour free 
trade than other people. Since workers in the agricultural sector are assumed to be less 
mobile than those working in the industrial sector and because of the higher level of 
protection in this sector, we guess that people working in agriculture would be more 
protectionist than those working in industry. On the other hand, we also classify 
agricultural and industrial activities into activities with comparative advantages and 
disadvantages as indicated by the CHELEM, CEPII database for the year 2003. According 
to the R-V model, we expect that people working in sectors with comparative 
disadvantages support protectionism, whereas the opposite should occur for people 
working in sectors with comparative advantages. 
3.2. Characterizing countries 
We take into account several macroeconomic indicators that may influence individual 
attitudes towards free trade. Specifically, we include Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita, average growth, inflation, production structure, import penetration rate and export 
ratios, all of which were obtained from the World Bank Database. Finally, we propose a set 
of characteristics that reflect different barriers to trade imposed and faced by the 
respondent’s country.   11
GNI per capita is used as a proxy for capital to labour intensity: a GNI per capita that is 
higher than the world average reflects a high capital to labour ratio. Moreover, countries 
with a higher GNI per capita also have a larger share of intra-industry trade. This type of 
specialization (at least as far as horizontal differentiation is concerned and to a lesser extent 
vertical differentiation), leads to lower adjustment costs and less resistance to trade 
liberalization. In order to check the Stolper-Samuelson theorem hypothesis, we also 
interact this variable with the individual skill level. 
Business cycles may influence respondents’ sensitivity to trade policies. We take into 
account past average growth and expect respondents to decrease their support for 
protectionism during phases of expansion. The rate of inflation is also included. This 
variable can influence individuals in several manners. On the one hand, insofar as a 
growing inflation rate reflects an uncertain macroeconomic context, the risk aversion of 
residents may grow and negatively affect their willingness to accept new adjustments 
caused by the dismantling of trade restrictions. On the other hand, the removal of trade 
restrictiveness decreases the price of imported products and the general level of prices in 
the economy, so people may wish to remove protectionist measures in this context. 
Though, the way inflation rate impacts individual trade policy preferences is not clear.  
We also take into account the import penetration rate (IPR). A high penetration rate could 
reflect a large level of dependency on foreign products and should be associated with a 
strong support for trade liberalization. However, the relationship between imports and pro-
protectionism may be more complex. Penetration rate also depends on trade policies. That 
is, a low penetration rate can reflect a very strong protectionist policy. In this case, a lower 
IPR may increase support for protectionism. In both of the previous cases, the relationship 
between IPR and PROTEC should be negative. In turn, if the presence of foreign products 
in the domestic market is perceived as an invasion of the domestic market and increase the 
demand for a protectionist policy, the relationship between IPR and PROTEC would be 
positive.  
We also take into account the ratio of exports to GDP (XRATIO) that has not been 
accounted for previously in the related literature. As far as national protectionist measures 
can be seen as a counterpart to the difficulties of exporting, a higher export to GDP ratio 
should lower support for protectionism.   12
As a natural complement of IPR and XRATIO, we include indicators reflecting the 
restrictiveness of the trade policy in the respondent’s country as well as the barriers placed 
on goods from the respondent’s country in the foreign market. We use the Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) and Market Access Index (MAOTRI) calculated by 
Anderson and Neary (2001). These indices take into account tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
imposed by a country in a multilateral context and how these barriers affect country’s 
imports and exports. A high OTRI for country X denotes that country X highly restricts the 
imports of foreign products. A high MAOTRI for country X reflects that country X’s 
exports face high barriers in foreign markets.  
As mentioned above, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) test whether trade policies have a non-
uniform influence on individuals’ attitudes within a country, but do not find significant 
evidence to back their hypothesis. Here we test if these measures affect individual attitudes 
in general. The way restrictive trade policies influence people’s opinions depends on the 
way they consider these policies to affect them and to what degree they are aware of these 
measures. In highly protected economies, individuals may value the inconveniences of 
such a policy more highly or, in contrast, they may fear the costs of removing protection. 
The expected sign for this coefficient is thus undetermined. Additionally, restrictive 
policies are, to a larger extent, explained by high support for protectionism so this index 
may suffer an endogenous bias. We also control for this possible bias using instrumental 
variables for OTRI.  
It is likely that residents in the exporting country will unanimously consider the effect of 
better access to international markets as being positive. Yet their level of awareness about 
these measures and how far this sentiment is connected to their support for national 
protectionism is less clear. If support for protectionism increases (significant positive sign) 
when there are difficulties for exporting; it will demonstrate that exports are viewed as a 
counterweight to the removal of national restrictions.  
We also take into account the region in which the country is located and if it had colonial 
ties with another country. The variables have been designed using information from the 
CEPII database. As mentioned earlier, geographic and historical proximity generally 
enhance bilateral trade and could positively affect opinions on bilateral trade policy and 
hence the level of duties among country-pairs. Thus, bilateral opinions are not available in  13
the ISSP dataset. Since the use of a common language is supposed to reduce information 
costs and facilitate networks, we check if speaking one of the most widely spoken 
languages in the world pushes down protectionist pressures. We also check to what extent 
the fact that the respondent’s country has been involved in a colonizing relationship leads 
to protectionism support.  
The graphs below offer a first overview of the relationship between some of these 
indicators and the amount of people supporting protectionist policies. The average support 
for protectionism clearly decreases as GNI per capita increases. We detect some outliers 
like the USA, which reveals stronger support for protectionism than predicted by the 
country’s GNI per capita, while the opposite occurs for Sweden. The relationship between 
trade policy instruments and protectionism support is not homogeneous. While countries 
that apply higher barriers to trade also show a strong support for protectionism, we observe 
important differences in support for protectionism among EU members, though the overall 
restrictiveness index for the EU seems to be correlated with the average support for 
protectionism shown by its members.  Heterogeneity is also striking among countries with 
lower barriers. The relationship between importing goods and services and the share of 
protectionist individuals is not as clear as for the GNI per capita. Strong heterogeneity is 
found among countries with a penetration rate of around 40 per cent.  
Figure 1: Share of persons supporting protectionism and GNI per capita, trade policy and 
import penetration 
 
4.  Results 
Table three presents the results of a series of regressions that explain support for 
protectionism. It is commonly accepted that country-specific factors influence individuals’ 
attitudes towards trade policies. For this reason, we first present a model that includes 
country dummies (model 3.1). Since we want to investigate in an in-depth manner the 
impact of country characteristics on individual attitudes and provide proof that they play a 
relevant role, we replace the country dummies for a set of selected country characteristics 
(models 3.2 - 3.5). Since the results for individual characteristics and the survey are 
affected very little by the specification used and the sample, we first discuss the individual 
characteristics that influence protectionist attitudes in subsection one. The influence of 
macroeconomic variables is discussed in subsection two. We provide an empirical  14
verification for the predictions of the H-O and the R-V models in section three. Section 
four analyses the impact of trade policy indicators. Finally, subsection five provides a 
sensitivity analysis of our main results for different groups of countries.   
4.1. Who supports protectionist measures? 
In analyzing the determinants of trade policy preferences, there are a number of non-
economic elements that need to be taken into account, namely political ideology, religious 
beliefs, pride and nationalism as well as demographic characteristics. In general, our 
empirical findings validate the theoretical framework. 
Table 3: Protectionism opinion – oprobit models with and without country dummies 
Firstly, the degree of religiosity (measured by weekly attendance to religious services) has 
a significant and positive coefficient, thus implying that people who attend religious 
services are more likely to support import-restrictive policies than the rest. Additionally, 
political options are determinants of trade preferences. Those who identify themselves with 
the right are less likely to support protectionism. However, trade union membership does 
not seem to affect preferences, although previous studies have found that this variable 
influences protectionist attitudes.  
As regards socio-demographic variables, the results show that gender is significant in 
forming preferences, indicating that women tend to be more protectionist than men. Age, 
however, is not significant. Regarding marital status, none of the variables studied revealed 
significant coefficients. Being single is the exception as it appears to be linked with 
protectionism in some specifications. 
As expected, feelings related to patriotism and nationalism affect preferences. However, 
feelings of attachment to one’s country are not significant, thus indicating that patriotism is 
not contradictory to non-protectionist preferences. On the other hand, strong feelings of 
national pride and national superiority are correlated with protectionist preferences, 
although pride for the democratic system of one’s country does not have a significant 
impact.  
Turning to occupational activities, we found that being unemployed does not have a 
significant impact in the formation of these opinions. This is an unexpected result that may 
be explained by the fact that unemployed persons do not feel they are affected by the  15
situation of a particular sector. In turn, people in unstable working conditions (part-time 
employees) are more supportive of protectionist measures. People employed full time are 
more willing to be pro-trade. Working for the government increases the probability of 
being pro-protectionist, whereas working for private or public firms is not significant.  
Relative economic status and skills also affect trade preferences in a significant manner. 
Individuals who place themselves higher on the income scale tend to be fewer 
protectionists than those who place themselves in a lower position on the scale. On the 
other hand, higher levels of education have a negative coefficient in the estimated model, 
meaning that those with a higher education are less likely to support protectionist policies.  
Our conclusions are similar to those of Daniels and von der Rhur (2005) and Mayda and 
Rodrik (2005) among others, who concluded that social status, relative income, values and 
attachments are the variables that most influence the formation of preferences. As far as 
attachments are concerned, our study also confirms that those who feel closer to their 
neighbourhood, community, country or who define themselves as nationalists tend to be 
more protectionists. We also agree that pro-trade preferences are positively and robustly 
correlated with individuals’ level of human capital.  
4.2. Macroeconomic context and individual attitudes 
Here we test if macroeconomic indicators have the expected impact on individual support 
for protectionism. When significant, the stock of capital per worker (GNI per capita) 
negatively affects support for protectionist measures as expected. The evidence concerning 
other new trade theories is also weak. English as an official language has no significant 
impact, while living in a Spanish-speaking country increases the probability of being 
protectionist. People living in countries closer to the USA or the EU are fewer 
protectionists than others. Living in countries that had a colonial relationship does not have 
a significant effect. The variables emphasized in new trade theories are determinants of 
bilateral trade more than multilateral trade. This may explain why they fail to explain 
protectionism measures regarding trading partners in general.  
More interesting conclusions are found regarding other macroeconomic indicators. The 
growth rate has no significant impact, whereas the inflation rate has a positive sign. While 
trade liberalization would rationally push prices down, support for protectionism increases 
when inflation pressures become high. Since high inflation is also synonymous of an  16
unstable macroeconomic context, it also translates into a risky environment. Hence, it 
looks like individuals consider that the losses suffered from trade liberalization would 
outweighted the gains, in particular the potential benefit to be obtained from price 
reductions. Finally, we find that a greater import penetration rate (IPR) positively affects 
protectionism support, while a greater export ratio (XRATIO) relaxes protectionist 
pressures.  
4.3. H-O and R-V predictions 
In models 3.4 and 3.5 (table three), we include dummies for the respondent’s sector of 
activity, distinguishing between agriculture, industry and services. Surprisingly, we find 
that all three sectors have a significant positive impact, suggesting that workers are, on 
average, more supportive of protectionist measures. Specifically, we expected people 
working in services not to be protectionist. Nonetheless, the marginal effects of these 
variables are more in line with our predictions since the highest impact is found in the case 
of agriculture (generally more protected) followed by industry and services.  
Additional results are found by testing the direct predictions of the H-O and R-V models. 
In order to test H-O predictions, we interact the variable EDUCYRS with the logarithm of 
per-capita GDP as in Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and introduce it in model 3.4. Since our 
sample could suffer from a selection bias towards high and middle income countries, we 
build alternative measures that take into account the relative endowment level of the 
countries. Namely, we build three dummies corresponding to: 1) being low-skilled in a 
high income country; 2) being high-skilled in a high income country and 3) being high-
skilled in a poor income country (due to colinearity we omit the last possibility, being low-
skilled in a low income country). The results are presented in table four.  
Table 4: Protectionism opinion, verification H-O model 
Coefficients for the interacted variable (EDUIPC) should be interpreted jointly with the 
coefficient of GNIPC and EDUCYRS. EDUCYRS presents a positive sign while EDUIPC 
presents a negative sign. This means that below a given GNIPC threshold level, education 
increases support for protectionism, while under a given GNIPC threshold level, low-skill 
individuals are more reticent towards free trade. Consequently, we expect that education 
increases protectionist support in countries such as the Philippines (the lowest GNIPC) and 
at the opposite end, educated people tend to favour free trade in richer countries like  17
Switzerland or Norway. Our results confirm that individuals take into account the 
redistributive effect of trade. 
Table 5: Protectionism opinion, verification of the R-V model 
To test whether the R-V model influences individual attitudes, we include two variables in 
model 5.4 to account for the comparative advantage or disadvantage (calculated in 
reference as the world trade structure) of the sector in which the respondents are working. 
Alternatively, we consider increasing comparative advantage or decreasing disadvantage 
since respondents may be more sensitive to the changes in the specialization pattern rather 
than to its level. Since highly specialized countries may be more sensitive to external 
shocks, we also build dummies to reflect the fact that the sector has a strong comparative 
advantage or disadvantage. In all of the models, working in a sector with a comparative 
advantage has no significant effect on the answer, while working in a disadvantaged sector 
has a positive and significant effect. Our results unambiguously indicate that individuals’ 
attitudes are biased towards losses.  
4.4. Trade policies 
Table 6: Trade policy impact on individual opinion towards protectionism 
Taking into account model 5.2 of table five, we include trade policy indicators and 
estimate six different models presented in table six. Results concerning trade policies are 
not as robust as those obtained for IPR and XRATIO, but follow the same line. High 
restriction levels on imports do not affect (when the IPR is also taken into account) or 
positively affect support for protectionism.  
As explained, it could be argued that an individual’s attitude towards OTRI is an 
endogenous variable.
4 To control for this bias, we instrument OTRI using variables that 
may affect the decision to restrain trade at the macroeconomic level. These instruments 
should not be correlated with the characteristics affecting individuals’ opinions which are 
not taken into account in the main equation, that is, we must select variables that are not 
correlated with the residuals of the ordered probit equation. The country characteristics 
selected may reflect the situation of the business cycle as well as some structural 
                                                 
4 To a lesser extent, this argument also applies for IPR since attitude indirectly affects trade policy that in turn 
affects imports. We also estimate models where the IPR is instrumentalised. Results are similar to those 
presented here and available upon request.   18
characteristics of the country’s production that may explain its balance of payments 
situation. Namely, we include inflation and growth rates; share of agriculture, services and 
industry in the GDP; MAOTRI and indicators of the income and debt group. The results 
for the first equation are highly significant. All the coefficients are significant at the one 
per cent level. These coefficients are as follows:  
 
 
Results show that trade restriction level does not have a significant impact on individual 
attitudes except in models where GNIPC, IPR and XRATIO are dropped and OTRI is 
instrumented. In this case, a high level of import barriers increases personal support for 
protectionism.  
The restrictions imposed on national goods in international markets have a more significant 
positive impact on individual support for protectionism. This means that people value the 
facilities or restrictions imposed by their trading partners when making decisions 
concerning their own trade policy. Although we are not able to investigate this dynamic 
game in depth, our results suggest that country will cooperate if its partner has cooperated, 
and it will defect if its partner has defected. Actually, reciprocal trade agreements are 
usually better accepted rather than unilateral liberalisation because negotiations offer an 
opportunity to improve market access to counterweight dismantling restrictions in the 
importing sector.  
4.5. Sensitivity analysis 
In table seven, we run model 3.4 for different groups of countries (large, small, EU, non-
EU, high income and low income) to check the sensitivity of our results concerning 
country characteristics. The variables included in the model generally have a significant 
impact on individual preferences, but the way they influence personal attitudes toward 
protectionism differs depending on the type of countries. The explanatory power of the 
model is, in general, larger for high income countries and small countries than for the 
others. 
  841.476   -   DEBT_GROUP * 0.032               
    UP INCOME_GRO * 0.020   -   VA_SER * 8.3416   VA_IND * 8.416 VA_AGR * 8.420               
    LMAOTRI * 0.176   -   GDP_GROWTH * 0.002   -   INFLATION * 0.003     OTRi
+ + +
+ = 19
 Table 7: Protectionism opinion – country characteristics    
We confirm that the social scale people place themselves on has a significant effect: those 
who consider themselves to be ‘rich’ tend to favour free trade more than those who see 
themselves as being ‘poor’. Additionally, we find that this is less true in high income 
countries. In the same way, years of schooling play a relevant role in that this variable 
reduces the probability of supporting restrictions on imports and its impact is almost the 
same in all the sub-samples. 
High GNI per capita is associated with pro-trade attitudes in large countries, but with pro-
protectionism in small countries and EU countries (it is not significant in other cases). 
Hence, we cannot draw clear conclusions about the influence of the intensity of capital to 
labour. The inflation rate always increases support for protectionism except in the case of 
large countries.  
Generally speaking, people living in countries with a higher import penetration rate are 
more likely to support protectionism. Actually, this is true overall for small countries and 
middle income countries, while the opposite occurs in large countries or EU countries. 
This result supports the view that the term-of-trade argument for protection has an impact 
on public opinion. Larger markets benefit from a power market that enables them to 
increase their term of trade by increasing the static gains of protection. A higher export 
ratio is associated with a non-protectionist attitude, with the exception of EU countries and 
large countries. Again, these results confirm that large countries are aware that they can 
take advantage of their weight in worldwide demand and supply.  
5.  Conclusions 
Our study confirms some previous results concerning the influence that social status, 
relative income, values and nationalism have on the formation of preferences for trade 
policies. Our study also highlights aspects of individual attitudes toward protectionism that 
have not previously been studied.  
Inflation rate has a positive effect on protectionism support, although it would be rational 
to expect trade liberalization to decrease prices. Working in a sector with a comparative 
disadvantage also increases protectionism support, whereas working in a sector with a 
comparative advantage does not influence respondents opinions.   20
As in other studies, we confirm that highly skilled people are more prone to support free 
trade wherever they live. This can be explained by the skill premium that is partly a result 
of technical progress or due to their greater mobility or capacity to understand the overall 
gains of trade liberalization. The other aspect of the Stolper Samuelson theorem holds: 
low-skilled people (or those who feel poor) in rich countries are more likely to be 
protectionist.  
More imports increase support for protectionism, while more exports decrease this support. 
Protectionist measures imposed by the respondent’s country increase support for 
protectionism after controlling for the endogenous bias but results are less robust. But more 
importantly, respondents take into account the access granted to their exports when 
considering the possibility of imposing restrictive measures on imports.  
Finally, we expected people living in richer countries to be more optimistic about trade 
liberalization because the greater part of their trade is intra-industry trade that has lower 
redistribution effects than inter-industry trade. Our results do not support this view. We 
found that residents of EU countries and large countries are aware of the possibility they 
have of increasing their terms of trade via protectionist measures.  
In sum, foreign products are seen as a threat for national production more than an 
opportunity for consumers and strategic aspects of trade policies seems to matter for the 
public opinion. Consequently, there are a wide range of circumstances such as recessions 
that may increase protectionism pressures; pressures which could quickly spread from one 
country to its trading partners. 
Our empirical findings have several implications for decision-makers. It appears that the 
best way to overcome the pessimistic view about international trade is to increase skills. 
Indeed, more highly-educated people are more likely to favour free trade wherever they 
live. Providing transparent information about trade restrictions, trade composition and the 
importance of export sectors and foreign markets might also reduce support for 
protectionism. Additionally, as far as trade is an important alternative to immigration 
pressure, people living in large and rich countries should be informed that increasing their 
market power may translate, indirectly into an increase of immigration pressure.  21
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1 . Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
COUNTRY ISO3 NO PROTECT PROTECT NEUTRAL 
   %% %  
Australia (omitted) AUS  14.5 66.1 19.4 
Austria AUT  23.5 58.8 17.7 
Bulgaria BGR 11.5 76.4 12.1 
Canada CAN  26.2 51.4 22.4 
Chile CHL  21.9 63.5 14.6 
Czech-Republic CZE  27.1 50.6 22.2 
Denmark DNK  48.1 35.6 16.4 
Finland FIN  38.4 34.0 27.6 
France FRA  27.8 51.7 20.5 
Germany DEU  33.0 44.3 22.7 
Great Britain  GBR 16.2 59.4 24.3 
Hungary HUN  13.3 65.3 21.4 
Ireland IRL  27.6 57.7 14.7 
Israel ISR 22.4 62.7 14.9 
Japan JPN  28.4 40.8 30.8 
Latvia LVA  15.9 66.9 17.2 
New Zealand NZL  21.3 57.0 21.7 
Norway NOR 36.4 35.1 28.5 
Philippines PHL  11.6 72.7 15.7 
Poland POL  12.1 71.9 15.9 
Portugal PRT  21.6 63.8 14.6 
Russia RUS  20.2 63.6 16.2 
Slovak Republic SVK  9.5 65.8 24.7 
Slovenia SVN  28.3 52.9 18.8 
South Korea KOR 24.7 52.6 22.7 
Spain ESP  14.7 59.5 25.8 
Sweden SWE  35.3 28.9 35.8 
Switzerland CHE  43.4 36.7 19.9 
United States  USA  17.2 61.4 21.4 
Uruguay URY  13.0 73.1 13.9 
  Note: Source: ISSP  25
Table 2: Description of variables 
Variable name Variable label Data source 
ADV  1 if sector of employment has a comparative 
advantage 
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
AGE  Respondent’s age  ISSP (2003) 
AGRICULTURE  1 if working in agricultural sector  ISSP (2003) 
ATTACH  1 if feeling close or very close to country  ISSP (2003) 
ATTEND  1 if respondent attends religious services once a 
week or more   ISSP (2003) 
DADV  1 if sector of employment has a comparative 
disadvantage 
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
DEBT_GROUP 
Countries are classified according to their debt 
classification (debt not classified, less indebted, 
moderately indebted and severely indebted) 
WDI, WB (2004) 
DEMPR  1 if feeling proud of the way democracy works  ISSP (2003) 
DISMADV  1 if employment sector comparative advantage 
has decreased 
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
DISMDADV  1 if employment sector comparative disadvantage 
has decreased  
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
ECONPR  1 if feeling proud of country’s economic 
achievement  ISSP (2003) 
EDUIPC  LGNIPC * EDUYRS   ISSP (2003)/ WDI, WB 
(2004) 
EDUYRS  Years of schooling  ISSP (2003) 
FEMALE  0 for men and 1 for women  ISSP (2003) 
GDP_GROWTH  Gross Domestic Product growth rate, 2000-2004 
average  WDI, WB (2004) 
HIGHEDU_POORCOUNTRY  1 if EDUYRS is higher than country average and 
LGNIPC is lower than world average 
ISSP (2003)/ WDI, WB 
(2004) 
INCADV  1 if employment sector comparative advantage 
has increased 
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
INCDADV  1 if employment sector comparative disadvantage 
has increased  
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
INCOME_GROUP 
Countries classification according to their income 
level (high income OCDE countries, high income 
non-OCDE countries, middle income countries 
and lower-middle income countries) 
WDI, WB (2004) 
INDUSTRY  1 if working in industry sector  ISSP (2003) 
INFLATION  Logarithm of inflation (2000-2004 average)  WDI, WB (2004) 
IPR  Logarithm of imports of goods and services 
(percentage GDP, 2000-2004 average)  WDI, WB (2004) 
LANGOFF_ENGLISH  1 if official language is English  Distance Database, 
CEPII (2008) 
LANGOFF_SPANISH  1 if official language is Spanish  Distance Database, 
CEPII (2008) 
LGNIPC  Logarithm of Gross National Income per capita, 
Atlas method (current US$)  WDI, WB (2004)  26
Variable name Variable label Data source 
LMAOTRI 
Logarithm of Market Access Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers)
Anderson and Neary 
(2001) 












LOTRI  Logarithm of Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(tariffs and non-tariff barriers) 
Anderson and Neary 
(2001) 
LOWEDU_POORCOUNTRY  1 if EDUYRS is lower than country average and 
LGNIPC is lower than world average 
ISSP (2003)/ WDI, WB 
(2004) 
LOWEDU_RICHCOUNTRY  1 if EDUYRS is lower than country average and 
LGNIPC is higher than world average  
ISSP (2003)/ WDI, WB 
(2004) 
LRINC  Logarithm of earnings  ISSP (2003) 
NATSUP 
1 if agreeing with ‘generally speaking, your 
country is a better country than most other 
countries’ 
ISSP (2003) 
NOT_MARRIED  1 if not married  ISSP (2003) 
PRIDE1  1 if feeling proud of country  ISSP (2003) 
PRIDE2 
1 if respondents agree that they should be 
concerned for their own interests, even if this 
leads to conflicts with other nations 
ISSP (2003) 
RIGHT  1 if party affiliation is right  ISSP (2003) 
SERVICE  1 if working in service sector  ISSP (2003) 
STRONGADV  1 if employment sector comparative advantage is 
strong 
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
STRONGDADV  1 if employment sector comparative disadvantage 
is strong 
ISSP (2003) / CHELEM, 
CEPII (2006) 
UNEMPLOYED  1 if being unemployed  ISSP (2003) 
UNION   1 if currently member of a union  ISSP (2003) 
UPPER_CLASS  1 if self-placement in 10-point income scale is 
between 6 and 10  ISSP (2003) 
VA_AGR  Agriculture, value added (percentage GDP, 2000-
2004 average)  WDI, WB (2004) 
VA_IND  Industry, value added (percentage GDP, 2000-
2004 average)  WDI, WB (2004) 
VA_SER  Service, value added (percentage GDP, 2000-
2004 average)    WDI, WB (2004) 
XRATIO  Logarithm of exports of goods and services 
(percentage GDP, 2000-2004 average)  WDI, WB (2004)   27
Table 3: Protectionism opinion, oprobit models with and without country dummies 
 
Model 3.1 -  with 
dummies per country 
Model 3.2 - with country 
characteristics 
Model 3.3 - model 3.2 
plus cultural variables 
and  proximity 
Model 3.4 - model 3.3 
plus sector of 
employment 
Model 3.5 - model 3.4 
without no significant 
individual characteristics 
Probability  0.5539 0.5543 0.5539 0.5577 0.5581 
   dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E. 
FEMALE  0.066***  [0.009] 0.083***  [0.009] 0.077*** [0.009]  0.081*** [0.010]  0.082*** [0.009] 
AGE  0.000 [0.0004]  0.000 [0.001]  0.000 [0.001]  0.000 [0.001]     
NOT_MARRIED -0.010 [0.012]  -0.003 [0.013] -0.002  [0.012] -0.014  [0.012]    
EDUYRS -0.018***  [0.002]  -0.016*** [0.002]  -0.017*** [0.002]  -0.016*** [0.002]  -0.016*** [0.002] 
UPPER_CLASS  -0.011  [0.009] -0.025***  [0.010] -0.024*** [0.009]  -0.020**  [0.009]  -0.030*** [0.009] 
LRINC  -0.047***  [0.010] -0.013* [0.007] -0.024*** [0.006]  -0.024*** [0.006]  -0.025*** [0.006] 
ATTEND  0.061***  [0.012] 0.075***  [0.018] 0.057*** [0.014]  0.055*** [0.015]  0.049*** [0.015] 
RIGHT -0.033**  [0.016]  -0.018  [0.018] -0.024  [0.016] -0.020  [0.016]    
UNION 0.017  [0.014]  -0.017  [0.014]  -0.001 [0.014]  -0.000 [0.014]     
ATTACH  0.000  [0.015] -0.006  [0.016] 0.007  [0.016] 0.009  [0.018]    
PRIDE1  0.129***  [0.012] 0.126***  [0.012] 0.121*** [0.012]  0.118*** [0.012]  0.113*** [0.012] 
PRIDE2  0.132***  [0.013] 0.119***  [0.012] 0.121*** [0.013]  0.119*** [0.014]  0.126*** [0.013] 
NATSUP  0.069***  [0.010] 0.081***  [0.012] 0.069*** [0.010]  0.074*** [0.011]  0.066*** [0.012] 
DEMPR -0.029**  [0.012]  -0.031***  [0.012]  -0.034*** [0.012]  -0.030**  [0.012]     
ECONPR -0.017*  [0.010]  0.002  [0.013]  -0.015 [0.011]  -0.021**  [0.011]     
AGRICULTURE        0.124***  [0.039]  0.114***  [0.038] 
INDUSTRY        0.056***  [0.014]  0.052***  [0.015] 
SERVICE        0.028**  [0.014]  0.022*  [0.014] 
LGNIPC     -0.064***  [0.011]  -0.003  [0.026] 0.005  [0.025] -0.006  [0.025] 
XRATIO      -0.337*** [0.091]  -0.410*** [0.119]  -0.402*** [0.110]  -0.393*** [0.105]   28
 
Model 3.1 -  with 
dummies per country 
Model 3.2 - with country 
characteristics 
Model 3.3 - model 3.2 
plus cultural variables 
and  proximity 
Model 3.4 - model 3.3 
plus sector of 
employment 
Model 3.5 - model 3.4 
without no significant 
individual characteristics 
IPR      0.325*** [0.087]  0.459*** [0.154]  0.452*** [0.144]  0.433*** [0.137] 
GDP_GROWTH      1.225  [0.779]  1.073  [0.723]  0.917  [0.707] 
INFLATION      1.342**  [0.643]  1.455**  [0.618]  1.456**  [0.586] 
LANGOFF_ENGLISH      0.058  [0.046]  0.059  [0.043]  0.054  [0.041] 
LANGOFF_SPANISH      0.056*  [0.031]  0.079***  [0.028]  0.056**  [0.026] 
LONGCOLONY      -0.002  [0.049]  0.004  [0.043]  0.015  [0.042] 
LOC_US      -0.058  [0.037]  -0.064* [0.039] -0.060  [0.038] 
LOC_UE      -0.098  [0.066]  -0.091 [0.061]  -0.076 [0.058] 
Observations  21179 21179 21179 17131 18544 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% , source: see table 2 
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Table 4: Protectionism opinion, verification of H-O model 
   
Model 4.1 – interaction effects 
Model 4.2 – relative 
endowment 
Probability  0.5716 0.5591 
 dy/dx  S.E.  dy/dx  S.E. 
FEMALE 0.080***  [0.010]  0.079***  [0.010] 
AGE 0.000  [0.0004]  0.000  [0.001] 
NOT_MARRIED -0.006  [0.013]  -0.007  [0.013] 
EDUYRS 0.052*  [0.029]    
EDUIPC -0.007**  [0.016]     
LOWEDU_RICHCOU
NT
  0.108***  [0.008] 
LOWEDU_POORCOU
NT
  0.046  [0.050] 
HIGHEDU_POORCOU
NT
  -0.015  [0.057] 
LRINC     -0.018***  [0.006] 
UPPER_CLASS -0.024**  [0.010] -0.035***  [0.009] 
ATTEND 0.057***  [0.015]  0.060***  [0.014] 
RIGHT -0.015  [0.016]  -0.015  [0.015] 
UNION -0.015  [0.016]  -0.009  [0.014] 
ATTACH 0.002  [0.015]  0.008  [0.016] 
PRIDE1 0.107***  [0.011]  0.122***  [0.010] 
PRIDE2 0.127***  [0.014]  0.119***  [0.013] 
NATSUP 0.074***  [0.012]  0.077***  [0.010] 
DEMPR -0.022*  [0.012]  -0.035***  [0.013] 
ECONPR -0.024**  [0.010]  -0.015  [0.010] 
AGRICULTURE 0.114***  [0.034] 0.118***  [0.036] 
INDUSTRY 0.045***  [0.012]  0.057***  [0.014] 
SERVICE 0.026**  [0.012]  0.025*  [0.014] 
LGNIPC 0.019  [0.037]  -0.080***  [0.024] 
XRATIO -0.222***  [0.072]  -0.223***  [0.054] 
IPR 0.179**  [0.086]  0.228***  [0.073] 
LANGOFF_ENGLISH 0.092***  [0.030]  0.100**  [0.039] 
LANGOFF_SPANISH 0.049  [0.033]  0.100***  [0.031] 
LONGCOLONY 0.014  [0.044] 0.001  [0.050] 
LOC_US -0.052  [0.035]  -0.039  [0.045] 
LOC_UE 0.016*  [0.038]  -0.025  [0.046] 
Observations 21848  18405 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.07 
         Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, source: see table 2  30
Table 5: Protectionism opinion, verification of the R-V model 
 




Model 5.2 – model 5.1 
plus comparative 
(dis) advantage 
Model 5.3 – model 
5.1 plus strong 
comparative 
(dis)advantage 
Model 5.4 – model 
5.1 plus evolutions of 
comparative 
(dis)advantage 
Probability  0.555 0.555  0.556 0.556 
  dy/dx  S.E.  dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E. 
FEMALE 0.082***  [0.009]  0.090***  [0.009]  0.085***  [0.009
]
0.087*** [0.009] 
AGE 0.000  [0.001]  0.000  [0.001]  0.000  [0.001
]
0.000 [0.001] 
EDUYRS -0.016***  [0.002]  -0.015*** [0.002]  -0.016*** [0.002
]
-0.015*** [0.002] 
UPPER_CLASS -0.033***  [0.010] -0.032*** [0.010]  -0.033*** [0.010
]
-0.033*** [0.010] 
LRINC -0.015**  [0.008]  -0.014*  [0.008]  -0.015**  [0.008
]
-0.014* [0.008] 
ATTEND 0.070***  [0.018]  0.068***  [0.017]  0.070***  [0.018
]
0.068*** [0.017] 
PRIDE1 0.121***  [0.012]  0.120***  [0.012]  0.121***  [0.012
]
0.120*** [0.012] 
PRIDE2 0.125***  [0.012]  0.126***  [0.012]  0.125***  [0.011
]
0.125*** [0.012] 
NATSUP 0.076***  [0.014]  0.075***  [0.014]  0.076***  [0.014
]
0.074*** [0.014] 
LGNIPC -0.071***  [0.012]  -0.070***  [0.012]  -0.071***  [0.012
]
-0.071*** [0.012] 
XRATIO -0.333***  [0.088]  -0.341***  [0.088]  -0.341***  [0.089
]
-0.341*** [0.088] 
IPR 0.317***  [0.083]  0.325***  [0.084]  0.326***  [0.085
]
0.325*** [0.085] 
ADV     0.014  [0.016]         
DADV    0.085***  [0.023]         
STRONGADV         -0.015  [0.031
]
  
STRONGDADV         0.073***  [0.028
]
  
DISMADV             -0.024  [0.024] 
DISMDADV             0.070***  [0.040] 
INCADV            0.037  [0.026] 
INCDADV             0.082***  [0.038] 
Observations  22905 22905  22905 22905 
Pseudo R-
d
0.07 0.07  0.07 0.07 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, source: see table 2   31
Table 6: Trade policy impact on individual opinion towards protectionism 
       





Model 6.2 – 
model 1 plus 
employment sector 
and MAOTRI 
Model 6.3 – 









Model 6.5 – 
model 4 plus 
MAOTRI 
Model 6.6 – 




Probability  0.551  0.555 0.563 0.555 0.555 0.562 
   dy/dx S.E.  dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. 
FEMALE  0.089***  [0.008
]
0.089***  [0.010] 0.085***  [0.009] 0.087***  [0.011]  0.084*** [0.011]  0.081*** [0.010] 
EDUYRS  -0.018***  [0.002
]
-0.017***  [0.002] -0.017***  [0.002] -0.017***  [0.002]  -0.017*** [0.002]  -0.018*** [0.002] 
UPPER_CLASS  -0.039***  [0.011
]
-0.036***  [0.011] -0.036***  [0.012] -0.062***  [0.015]  -0.060*** [0.015]  -0.057*** [0.016] 
LRINC  -0.014*  [0.008
]
-0.015*  [0.008] -0.016*  [0.008] -0.009  [0.013]  -0.013 [0.012]  -0.014 [0.011] 
ATTEND  0.044***  [0.015
]
0.046***  [0.017] 0.039**  [0.017] 0.088***  [0.026]  0.092*** [0.027]  0.076*** [0.023] 
PRIDE1  0.132***  [0.013
]
0.129***  [0.014] 0.123***  [0.015] 0.133***  [0.015]  0.136*** [0.015]  0.125*** [0.016] 
PRIDE2  0.130***  [0.011
]
0.126***  [0.012] 0.124***  [0.012] 0.134***  [0.014]  0.129*** [0.012]  0.125*** [0.012] 
NATSUP  0.068***  [0.016
]
0.066***  [0.014] 0.059***  [0.015] 0.058**  [0.024] 0.050***  [0.019] 0.039**  [0.018] 
AGRICULTURE      0.094**  [0.037] 0.087**  [0.038] 0.097**  [0.037] 0.102***  [0.035] 0.091**  [0.037] 
INDUSTRY      0.041***  [0.016] 0.046***  [0.016] 0.030* [0.015]  0.031* [0.017]  0.040**  [0.016] 
SERVICE      0.008  [0.013] 0.010  [0.014] 0.000  [0.015]  -0.002 [0.015]  -0.002 [0.015] 
LGNIPC  -0.079***  [0.021
]
-0.079***  [0.021] -0.058***  [0.019]            
XRATIO  -0.327***  [0.092
]
-0.264***  [0.078] -0.277***  [0.081]            
IPR  0.262***  [0.099
]
0.197**  [0.096] 0.230**  [0.095]            
LOTRI  -0.341  [0.454
]
-0.565  [0.487]     0.597**  [0.304] 0.307  [0.384]    
LMAOTRI      0.751**  [0.380] 0.564*  [0.331]     1.194**  [0.520] 0.887*  [0.457] 
LOTRI_instrumented         0.259  [0.398]        1.096**  [0.448] 
Observations  18770  14920 14348 14920 14920 14348 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 
  Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, source: see table 2   32
Table 7: Protectionism opinion - country characteristics  
  Model 7.1 – all 
countries 
Model 7.2 – big 
countries 
Model 7.3 – small 
countries 
Model 7.4 – EU 
countries 
Model 7.5 – Non 
EU countries 
Model 7.6 – high 
income countries 
Model 7.7 – 
middle income 
countries 
Probability  0.5577 0.5643 0.5549  0.4813 0.5932 0.5038 0.6747 
  dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E. 
FEMALE  0.081***  [0.010] 0.074***  [0.015] 0.071***  [0.012] 0.062***  [0.014] 0.073***  [0.013] 0.096***  [0.011] 0.037**  [0.019] 
AGE  0.000  [0.001] -0.002**  [0.001] 0.000  [0.001] -0.002*** [0.001] 0.001  [0.001] -0.001  [0.001] 0.000  [0.001] 
NOT_MARRIED -0.014  [0.012]  -0.031  [0.028] -0.012  [0.013] -0.050*** [0.017] 0.007 [0.016]  -0.026*  [0.015]  0.012  [0.020] 
EDUYRS -0.016***  [0.002]  -0.018***  [0.034]  -0.016***  [0.002] -0.020*** [0.003] -0.015*** [0.003] -0.021*** [0.002] -0.008** [0.004] 
UPPER_CLASS  -0.020**  [0.009] 0.017  [0.012] -0.023*  [0.013] 0.009  [0.011] -0.011  [0.014] -0.024** [0.011]  -0.016  [0.012] 
LRINC  -0.024*** [0.006] -0.050**  [0.020] -0.030***  [0.005] -0.110*** [0.020] -0.020*** [0.005] -0.025*** [0.009] -0.012  [0.017] 
ATTEND  0.055***  [0.015] 0.062***  [0.012] 0.052**  [0.020] 0.054**  [0.023] 0.061***  [0.016] 0.072***  [0.013] 0.049  [0.031] 
RIGHT  -0.020  [0.016] -0.020  [0.021] -0.028  [0.023] 0.008  [0.015] -0.043*  [0.024] -0.008  [0.016] -0.088** [0.043] 
UNION  0.000  [0.014] -0.009  [0.027] 0.023  [0.014] 0.026**  [0.013] 0.016  [0.019] 0.014  [0.014] -0.017  [0.039] 
ATTACH  0.009  [0.018] -0.001  [0.026] 0.007  [0.024] -0.005  [0.029] 0.012  [0.021] 0.010  [0.023] -0.011  [0.023] 
PRIDE1  0.118***  [0.012] 0.151***  [0.024] 0.105***  [0.013] 0.135***  [0.018] 0.118***  [0.016] 0.120***  [0.013] 0.109*** [0.020] 
PRIDE2  0.074***  [0.014] 0.046***  [0.020] 0.089***  [0.019] 0.095***  [0.029] 0.072***  [0.016] 0.087***  [0.015] 0.042*** [0.018] 
NATSUP  0.119***  [0.011] 0.127*  [0.024] 0.128***  [0.011] 0.142***  [0.021] 0.112***  [0.012] 0.121***  [0.019] 0.122**  [0.029] 
DEMPR  -0.030**  [0.012] -0.001  [0.030] -0.039*** [0.011]  -0.044** [0.019]  -0.014  [0.015] -0.035**  [0.014] -0.022  [0.022] 
ECONPR -0.021**  [0.011]  -0.014**  [0.023] -0.027**  [0.013] -0.034*  [0.020] -0.013 [0.012]  -0.022*  [0.011]  -0.018  [0.020] 
AGRICULTURE  0.124***  [0.039] 0.125*  [0.062] 0.125***  [0.045] 0.180***  [0.055] 0.096**  [0.046] 0.195***  [0.040] 0.042  [0.053] 
INDUSTRY  0.056***  [0.014] 0.081***  [0.024] 0.041**  [0.019] 0.047***  [0.017] 0.056***  [0.019] 0.065***  [0.013] 0.034  [0.031] 
SERVICE  0.028**  [0.014] 0.069***  [0.015] 0.011  [0.018] 0.051**  [0.021] 0.021  [0.021] 0.039**  [0.015] 0.013  [0.026] 
LGNIPC  0.005  [0.025] -0.082**  [0.040] 0.031  [0.039] 0.495***  [0.079] -0.001  [0.023] 0.051 [0.071]  -0.016  [0.041] 
XRATIO  -0.402*** [0.110] 0.206*  [0.118] -0.332**  [0.159] 0.383  [0.424] -0.484*** [0.069] -0.364*** [0.116] -0.682** [0.276] 
IPR  0.452***  [0.143] -0.417*** [0.159] 0.511***  [0.157] -0.439  [0.441] 0.527***  [0.087] 0.383**  [0.172] 0.758*** [0.253]   33
  Model 7.1 – all 
countries 
Model 7.2 – big 
countries 
Model 7.3 – small 
countries 
Model 7.4 – EU 
countries 
Model 7.5 – Non 
EU countries 
Model 7.6 – high 
income countries 
Model 7.7 – 
middle income 
countries 
GDP_GROWTH  1.073  [0.721] 10.980*** [3.071] 1.412  [0.914] -0.880  [2.907] 0.127  [0.558] 1.314  [1.288] 0.026  [0.639] 
INFLATION  1.455**  [0.615] -4.539*** [1.377] 2.862***  [0.590] 20.662*** [6.581] 1.547***  [0.431] 2.249**  [1.056] 2.237**  [1.132] 
LANGOFF_ENGLISH 0.059  [0.043] 0.251***  [0.068] 0.010  [0.052] 0.163***  [0.060] 0.007  [0.059] 0.117***  [0.041] 0.051  [0.054] 
LANGOFF_SPANISH 0.079***  [0.028] 0.100***  [0.020] -0.078  [0.074] -0.202**  [0.074] 0.049  [0.076] 0.070  [0.056]    
LONGCOLONY  0.004  [0.043] 0.017  [0.086] 0.003  [0.032] -0.324*** [0.056] -0.005  [0.038] -0.040 [0.054]  0.006 [0.067] 
LOC_US  -0.064*  [0.039] 0.133  [0.099]         -0.084* [0.049]  -0.113**  [0.045]  0.063  [0.045] 
LOC_UE  -0.091  [0.061] 0.314***  [0.062] -0.253***  [0.084]     -0.096  [0.059] -0.123*  [0.067]    
Observations  17131  5208 11923 5587 11544  11930  5201 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.08 0.06 0.09  0.10 0.07 0.08 0.05 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, source: see table 2 
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2 . Figures  
Figure 1: share of persons supporting protectionism and GNI per capita 
     Note: ISO3 countries abbreviations are reported in table 1 
 
Figure 2: share of persons supporting protectionism and trade policy 
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     Note: ISO3 countries abbreviations are reported in table 1 